Vincent Conitzer
- Center for Theoretical & Mathematical Sciences
- D207 Levine Science Research Center
- Campus Box 90129
- Phone: (919) 660-6503
- Homepage
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Overview
Professor Vincent Conitzer's research focuses on issues in the intersection of computer science (especially artificial intelligence) and economics. This includes the design of new marketplaces and other negotiation protocols that allow humans and software agents to express their preferences naturally and accurately, and that generate good outcomes based on these preferences. It also includes the design of software agents that can act strategically in settings where multiple parties all pursue their own interests. This requires the use of concepts from game theory, as well as operationalizing these concepts by finding efficient algorithms for computing the corresponding solutions. Finally, his research includes the study of all settings in computer science in which multiple parties will act in their own self-interest, as well as the design of incentive mechanisms to reach good outcomes in spite of such behavior. -
Specialties
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Research Summary
(Computational aspects of) game theory, mechanism design, social choice theory, auctions and exchanges, electronic commerce -
Research Description
Professor Vincent Conitzer's research focuses on issues in the intersection of computer science (especially artificial intelligence) and economics. This includes the design of new marketplaces and other negotiation protocols that allow humans and software agents to express their preferences naturally and accurately, and that generate good outcomes based on these preferences. It also includes the design of software agents that can act strategically in settings where multiple parties all pursue their own interests. This requires the use of concepts from game theory, as well as operationalizing these concepts by finding efficient algorithms for computing the corresponding solutions. Finally, his research includes the study of all settings in computer science in which multiple parties will act in their own self-interest, as well as the design of incentive mechanisms to reach good outcomes in spite of such behavior.
